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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS OF WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT BODY FINDINGS ON THE U.S.
ANTIDUMPING SUNSET REVIEW REGIME
Changho Sohn*
I. INTRODUCTION
The antidumping mechanism by which a country protects its
domestic industry from an alleged dumping1 by foreign producers has
always been a trade remedy-of-choice utilized by U.S. trade authori-
ties.2 This aspect is aptly demonstrated by the number of U.S. an-
tidumping duty orders imposed upon foreign producers which
currently stands at 229.' With such a large number of antidumping
duties being imposed, it is natural for those countries subject to the
orders to explore ways to curtail them. Such position has materialized
in various WTO fora, in particular, through numerous cases that were
brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") challenging the
consistency of the U.S. antidumping duty impositions since 1995 when
the DSB adjudication procedure was stipulated into the WTO system.4
Complex as is the antidumping regime,5 the DSB cases address almost
every technical issue that is involved in the decision making process of
the antidumping duty determination. However, one area that had
* J.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School, 2006 (Deputy Director of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea) <e-mail:
cs2188@columbia.edu>. The views expressed are personal and should not be at-
tributed to the Ministry. I would like to thank Professor Petros C. Mavroidis of
Columbia Law School for his invaluable comment, guidance, and encouragement. I
would also like to express gratitude to Deputy Director, Mr. Jin Won Choi of WTO
Division of the Ministry for his helpful comments.
1 A product is considered to be dumped if the export price of the product exported
from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the export-
ing country. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 2.1 [hereinafter AD].
2 See BRINK LINDSEY ET AL., ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED, THE DEVILISH DETAILS OF UN-
FAIR TRADE LAw (2003).
3 Current as of June 2005. World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Gateway,
Antidumping Measures: By Exporting Country, at http://www.wto.orglenglish/
tratop-e/adp-e/adp-e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
4 The DSB cases on the U.S. antidumping number 25. Dispute Settlement Gate-
way, World Trade Organization, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/
dispu-e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
5 See LINDSEY, supra note 2, at xi.
178 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 6:2
been noticeably absent from the issues analyzed by the DSB pertained
to the sunset review regime. This is due to the temporal aspect of sun-
set reviews which requires a mandatory review of the antidumping
duty after five years from its original imposition. Therefore, it was
only after 1998 that the first U.S. sunset review was initiated in accor-
dance with the U.S. rules and regulations implementing WTO law6
and that the cases were subsequently brought to the DSB disputing
their WTO consistency.
This article surveys the WTO DSB's decisions regarding the
U.S. antidumping sunset review process. The first part of the article
summarizes the WTO provisions on antidumping sunset reviews and
the relevant U.S. law. The second part surveys various sunset review
issues that were raised by the cases brought to the DSB. Three DSB
cases, namely US - OCTG (Mexico), US - OCTG (Argentina), and US -
Carbon Steel, addressed sunset review issues.7 From these findings by
the DSB, fourteen main issues are surveyed in this article. The issues
are divided into two types: "as such" issues and "as applied" issues.
The former refers to the issues addressing the WTO consistency of the
U.S. sunset review rules and regulations and the latter refers to the
issues addressing the WTO consistency of the actual implementation
of the rules and regulations, "as applied." The third part of the article
examines the U.S. implementation of the DSB findings which pertains
to the findings in US - OCTG (Argentina). Finally, some comments
and policy considerations are suggested with regard to the case law
examined in the previous sections. The DSB findings on the fourteen
issues are summarized below:
"As Such" Issues
1. Sunset Policy Bulletin (63 Fed. Reg. 18,871): Consistent
2. Likelihood factors (19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c)(1)): Consistent
3. Meaning of "likely" (19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(1)): Consistent
4. Likelihood timeframe (19 U.S.C. §1675a(a)(5)): Consistent
6 Transition Orders: Final Schedule and Grouping of Five-Year Reviews, 63 Fed.
Reg. 29,372, 29,374 (Apr. 16, 1998); Antidumping, Steel Jacks, et al., 63 Fed. Reg.
36,389 (July 6, 1998). For the U.S. law, see section II.3. of this article.7 Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country
Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico, WT/DS282/AB/R (Nov. 2, 2005) and Panel
Report, WT/DS282/R (June 20, 2005) [hereinafter US - OCTG (Mexico)]; Appel-
late Body Report, United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2004) and
Panel Report, WT/DS268/R (July 16, 2004) [hereinafter US - OCTG (Argentina)];
Appellate Body Report, United States - Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat products from Japan, WT/244/AB/R (Dec.
15, 2003) and Panel Report, WT/244/R (Aug. 14, 2003) [hereinafter US-Carbon
Steel].
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Cumulation (19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(7)):
Automatic initiation (19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(2)):
De minimis rule (19 C.F.R. § 351.106(c)):
Order-wide determination (SPB § II.A.2):
Waiver (19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(4)(B)):
Causation rule (19 U.S.C. § 1675(c))S:
"As Applied" Issues
11. Likelihood of dumping:
12. Likelihood of injury:
13. Likelihood timeframe:
14. Zeroing:
Consistent
Consistent
Consistent
Consistent
Inconsistent
Consistent
Inconsistent
(US - OCTG (Mexico))
Inconsistent
(US - OCTG (Argentina))
Consistent
(US - Carbon Steel)
Consistent
(US - OCTG (Mexico))
Consistent
(US - OCTG (Argentina))
Consistent
(US - OCTG (Argentina))
Judgment Declined
(US - Carbon Steel)
II. ANTIDUMPING SUNSET REVIEW LAW
1. Overview of Antidumping Sunset Reviews
Antidumping sunset reviews establish mandatory reviews of
antidumping duties after five years from the initial imposition. The
rationale behind the review is that "anti-dumping duties should re-
main in force only so long as they [are] generally necessary to counter-
act dumping which [is] causing or threatening material injury to a
domestic industry."9 Article 11.3 of the AD which stipulates the
threshold duration of five years signifies this presumption that five
years is enough to counteract the dumping. Sunset reviews will deter-
mine whether the antidumping duty should be continued. Unless the
antidumping authorities determine that "the expiry of the duty would
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury,"
the antidumping measure will be terminated. 10 The sunset review pro-
vision was incorporated into the WTO antidumping regime after the
Uruguay Round, when member states signed the GATT Final Act Em-
8 See infra note 84.
9 JOSEPH E. PArTISON, WTO ANTIDUMPING AND SUBSIDY AGREEMENTS 6 (2005); see
also, AD art. 11.1.10 AD, supra note 1, at art. 11.3.
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bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral trade Nego-
tiations on April 15, 1994.11
2. WTO Law
Article 11.3 of the AD addresses antidumping sunset reviews.
It is stated as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1
and 2 [of Article 11], any definitive anti-dumping duty
shall be terminated on a date not later than five years
from its imposition (or from the date of the most recent
review under paragraph 2 if that review has covered
both dumping and injury, or under this paragraph), un-
less the authorities determine, in a review initiated
before that date on their own initiative or upon a duly
substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domes-
tic industry within a reasonable period of time prior to
that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to
lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and in-
jury. The duty may remain in force pending the outcome
of such a review. (footnote omitted).1 2
There are few AD provisions that describe in detail the actual proce-
dure and substantive analysis that the investigating authority must
observe. Article 11.4 states that provisions of Article 6 regarding evi-
dence and procedure shall be applied to sunset reviews.1 3 Article
18.3.2 provides transitory measures for the antidumping duty orders
imposed before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 14 In
this respect, sunset reviews differ from original investigations that is
governed by extensive legal and procedural framework provided in Ar-
ticles 3 and 5 of the AD.
3. U.S. Law
(a) Statutory Provisions
Consistent with the WTO provisions, the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act ("URAA") 15 provides the statutory foundation that
governs the antidumping sunset review process. The relevant provi-
sion is as follows:
5 years after the date of publication of-
11 PATTISON, supra note 9, at 30, 31.
12 AD, art. 11.3.
13 Id.
14 Id. at art 18.3.2.
15 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (Dec. 8,
1994) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 17, 18, 19, 29 U.S.C.).
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(A) . . . an antidumping duty order, . . . the ad-
ministering authority and the [International Trade]
Commission shall conduct a review to determine, in ac-
cordance with section 1675a of this title, whether revoca-
tion of the... antidumping duty order.., would be likely
to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping ... and
of material injury.16
More detailed rules and regulations on sunset reviews are provided in
19 U.S.C. § 1675a and 19 C.F.R. § 351.218. Additionally, there is "The
Uruguay Round Agreement Act Statement of Administrative Action"
("SAA")1 which provides an "authoritative expression by the United
States of its views concerning the interpretation and application of the
[law] ."18
(b) Administrative Guideline
There is also an administrative guideline called the Sunset Pol-
icy Bulletin ("SPB")'9 which is "intended to complement the applicable
statutory and regulatory provisions by providing guidance on method-
ological or analytical issues not explicitly addressed by the statute and
regulations."2 ° It delineates a detailed guideline as to how sunset re-
views should be administered. For example, section II of the Bulletin
covers the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping2 1 and the magnitude of the margin of dumping that is likely
to prevail.22 Factors such as the weighted-average dumping margins
determined in the investigations and the volume of imports must be
considered by the Department of Commerce ("DOC") in implementing
sunset reviews.23
III. DSB FINDINGS ON U.S. ANTIDUMPING SUNSET REVIEW
PROVISIONS "AS SUCH"
1. The SPB is not inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD.
(a) The SPB is a "measure" that is subject to a WTO challenge.
A "measure" is mentioned in Article 3.3 of the "Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes"
16 Id. at 4861.
17 H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040.
18 Id. at 4054.
19 Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year ("Sunset") Reviews of Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,871 (Apr. 16, 1998).
20 Id. at 18,872.
21 Id. at 18,872-73.
22 Id. at 18,873-74.
23 Id. at 18,872.
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("DSU"),2 4 which refers to "situations in which a [WTO] Member con-
siders that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the
covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another
Member." Reversing the Panel decision in US - Carbon Steel which
held that the SPB does not constitute a "measure" under the DSU, the
Appellate Body ("AB") found that a broad range of measures could be
brought to a DSB Panel25 as long as the measure "nullifies or impairs
benefits accruing to it under the AD." 26 The AB further cited Article
18.4 of the AD, and held that laws, regulations, and administrative
procedures of the Article "seem to encompass the entire body of gener-
ally applicable rules, norms, and standards adopted by [a WTO] Mem-
ber in connection with the conduct of anti-dumping proceedings. 27
The U.S. argument that the SPB is not a mandatory rule thus not
binding on the investigating authority was held to be irrelevant faced
with the "comprehensive nature of the right of [WTO] Members to re-
sort to dispute settlement to preserve rights and obligations."2' Other
cases have subsequently followed the US - Carbon Steel finding.2 9
(b) The SPB is not inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD.
The AB in US - OCTG (Mexico) held that the SPB is not incon-
sistent with Article 11.3 of the AD because the Bulletin does not estab-
lish an irrefutable presumption in sunset reviews. Article 11.3
requires that the review "be made on a sufficient factual basis, taking
into consideration the circumstances of the case at issue," and "cannot
be based on presumptions that establish outcomes ... to the exclusion
of a full examination of the factual circumstances."30 The SPB stipu-
lates three scenarios that Mexico alleged to establish irrefutable pre-
sumptions. The scenarios are stated in section II. A.3 of the SPB as
follows:
3. Likelihood of Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping
... the [DOC] normally will determine that revocation of
an antidumping duty order ... is likely to lead to contin-
uation or recurrence of dumping where -
24 Uruguay Round Agreements, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 3.3, available at http://www.wto.org/
englishldocs-e/legal-e/legal-e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) [hereinafter DSU].
25 US - Carbon Steel, supra note 7, TI 85.
26 Id. 86. See also DSU supra note 24, arts. 17.3 to .4.
27 US - Carbon Steel, f 87.
28 Id. T 90.
29 See, e.g., US - OCTG (Argentina), supra note 7, 182-189.
30 Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, 7.25; see also, Appellate
Body Report, US - Carbon Steel, supra note 7, T 114.
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(a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis af-
ter the issuance of the order or the suspension agree-
ment, as applicable;
(b) imports of the subject merchandise ceased after issu-
ance of the order or the suspension agreement, as appli-
cable; or
(c) dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the or-
der or the suspension agreement, as applicable, and im-
port volumes for the subject merchandise declined
significantly.3 1
The Panel in US - OCTG (Mexico) first analyzed whether the
text of section II. A.3 of the SPB mandated an irrebutable presumption
as alleged by Mexico, but found it to be inconclusive. 2 The Panel then
proceeded to "extend the analysis to consider what the evidence of the
[DOC's] application of the SPB reveals about the [DOC's] view of what
the SPB envisions in sunset reviews." 3 The Panel relied on the quali-
tative analysis of 21 applicable U.S. sunset review cases, examining
factors that were used in the sunset reviews and determined that the
DOC had been unwilling "to actually undertake an analysis of evi-
dence other than evidence of import volumes and dumping margins,"
thus inconsistent with Article 11.3 which requires a sufficient factual
basis for the likelihood determinations. 4 The AB, however, disagreed
with the Panel's finding after re-examining the Panel's qualitative
analysis. 5 The AB determined that the Panel's qualitative analysis
overlooked the possibility that the DOC might have considered factors
other than the SPB scenarios and that the Panel did not offer any defi-
nite evidence denying this possibility, instead relying on mere conjec-
tures that were not supported by facts.3 6 Therefore, the Panel's
qualitative analysis was held to be improperly conducted and was con-
sequently reversed.
2. Likelihood factors enumerated in 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c)(1) are not
inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD.
The Panel in US - OCTG (Mexico) held that 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675a(c)(1) is not inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD because
factors enumerated in the provision do not carry conclusive weight in
31 Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-Year ("Sunset") Reviews of Antidump-
ing and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. 18, 871 (April 16, 1998).
32 Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), 7.45.
33 Id.
34 Id. 7.59.
35 Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, 210.
36 See id., 206, 207.
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determining the outcome of sunset reviews.3 7 If the factors are deter-
minative or conclusive it is inconsistent with Article 11.3. 3 1 If the fac-
tors are treated as merely indicative however, it is not inconsistent.3 9
The U.S. provision is stated as follows:
(c) Determination of likelihood of continuation or recur-
rence of dumping
(1) In general. In a review conducted under [19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(c)], the administering authority shall determine
whether revocation of an antidumping duty order ...
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of
sales of the subject merchandise at less than fair value.
The administering authority shall consider -
(A) the weighted average dumping margins determined
in the investigation and subsequent reviews, and
(B) the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for
the period before and the period after the issuance of the
anti-dumping duty order or acceptance of the suspension
agreement.4 °
Mexico argued that this provision, if read in conjunction with the SAA
and the SPB, will result in the factors being treated as determinative
or conclusive.4 1 The Panel disagreed with Mexico stating that the text
of 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c)(1) does not present any determinative or con-
clusive weight to the enumerated factors.4 2 The Panel further held
that the language of the SAA, which only resorted to language such as
"illustrative" and "case-by-case basis," indicates clearly that "these fac-
tors are to be treated as important indicators of the likelihood of con-
tinuation or recurrence of dumping, but not as determinative or
conclusive on that issue."4 3
3. "Likely" in 19 U.S.C. § 1657a(a)(1) is not inconsistent with
Article 11.3 of the AD.
The Panel in US - OCTG (Mexico) held that 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675a(a)(1) is not inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD. The U.S.
provision is stated as follows:
37 Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, 7.38.
38 Id. 7.30.
39 Id.
40 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(c)(1) (2006).
41 Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, 7.35.
42 Id. 7.33.
43 Id. 7.36. The Panel did not address the SPB because unlike the SAA, the SPB
was deemed subordinate to the statute, merely complementing it thus cannot "fun-
damentally change the meaning of the statute." See id. 7.40.
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(a) Determination of likelihood of continuation or recur-
rence of material injury
(1) In general
In a review conducted under . . . [19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)],
the [International Trade] Commission shall determine
whether revocation of an order, or termination of a sus-
pended investigation, would be likely to lead to continua-
tion or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably
foreseeable time. The [International Trade] Commission
shall consider the likely volume, price effect, and impact
of imports of the subject merchandise on the industry if
the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is
terminated. (emphasis added).4 4
The ordinary meaning of "likely" in Article 11.3 was held to be "proba-
ble" rather than "possible."4 5 Mexico presented the Panel with evi-
dence that despite the U.S. contention that it relies on the "probable"
standard, the U.S. has actually conceded that it resorts to the "possi-
ble" standard during a NAFTA litigation.4" The Panel, however, re-
jected the relevance of the U.S. position stated in another forum and
instead relied on the U.S. court decision which equated "likely" with"probable,"4 7 holding that the U.S. court's decision can be construed as
the U.S. position, thus not inconsistent with the AD."4 In US - OCTG
(Argentina), the AB, faced with a similar "as applied" argument, ac-
knowledged the wide discretion that a Panel enjoys in weighing differ-
ent evidences, thus affirming the Panel's decision not to resort to the
NAFTA litigation evidence.4 9
4. The timeframe rule (19 U.S.C. § 1657a(a)(5)) is not inconsistent
with Article 11.3 of the AD.
The AB in US - OCTG (Argentina) held that the timeframe
rule stipulated in 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(5) is not inconsistent with Arti-
cles 11.3 of the AD. The U.S. provision is stated as follows:
(5) Basis for determination
The presence or absence of any factor which the [Interna-
tional Trade] Commission is required to consider under
this subsection shall not necessarily give decisive gui-
44 19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(a)(1) (2006).
45 Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, 7.96.
46 Id; see also, id. Annex C-1 14 (Executive Summary of the Second Submissions
of Mexico).
47 NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 288 F. Supp.2d 1306, 1351 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2003).
48 Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), 7.97.
49 Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Argentina), TT 306, 312, 313.
2006]
186 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 6:2
dance with respect to the [International Trade] Commis-
sion's determination of whether material injury is likely
to continue or recur within a reasonably foreseeable time
if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is
terminated. In making that determination, the [Interna-
tional Trade] Commission shall consider that the effects
of revocation or termination may not be imminent, but
may manifest themselves only over a longer period of
time. (emphasis added).
Argentina argued that the timeframe allowed under Article 11.3
should be based upon a finding of likely injury upon expiry of the order
and argued that the timeframe stipulated in Articles 3.7, "clearly fore-
seen and imminent," should be applied.5 ° Argentina relied on footnote
9 of Article 3 of the AD which arguably equates "injury" used in origi-
nal investigations with that of sunset reviews. 5 ' The AB rejected Ar-
gentina's argument by holding that Article 3 is inapplicable to sunset
reviews "[g]iven the absence of textual cross-references, and given the
different nature and purpose of thee two determinations."5 2 The Panel
made a similar finding in US - OCTG (Mexico), holding that: (1) Arti-
cles 11.1 and 11.3 do not specify any timeframe for sunset reviews;53
and (2) Articles 3.7 and 3.8, which govern investigation procedure,
serve a different purpose than the review process.5 4
5. The cumulation rule (19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(7)) is not inconsistent
with Articles 3.3 and 11.3 of the AD.
The AB in US - OCTG (Argentina) held that the "cumulation"
stipulated in 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(7) is not inconsistent with Articles
3.3 and 11.3 of the AD. The U.S. provision is stated as follows:
(7) Cumulation
For purposes of this subsection, the [International
Trade] Commission may cumulatively assess the volume
and effect of imports of the subject merchandise from all
countries with respect to which reviews under . . . [19
U.S.C. § 1675(c)] of this title were initiated on the same
day, if such imports would be likely to compete with each
other and with domestic like products in the United
States market. The [International Trade] Commission
shall not cumulatively assess the volume and effects of
imports of the subject merchandise in a case in which it
50 Id. 357.
5' Id. 358.
52 Id. [ 280, 358.
53 Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, 7.103.
54 Id. [ 7.105.
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determines that such imports are likely to have no dis-
cernible adverse impact on the domestic industry.
Cumulation is a process where imports are aggregated to assess their
combined injurious effect. Such process is warranted when individual
import has a negligible effect, but may have significant impact if ag-
gregated.55 Argentina argued that the usage of word "duty," rather
than "duties" in Article 11.3 implied that the drafters intended to treat
the import individually, rather than cumulatively.56 Argentina further
argued that the difference between an original investigation and a
sunset review process warranted the denial of the applicability of cu-
mulation since the cumulation is only stipulated in Article 3.3, without
any cross-reference to Article 11.3. The AB disagreed with Argentina
and held that: (1) the usage of singular and plural form of "duty" does
not have any significance within the AD;57 (2) the objective of cumula-
tion in an original investigation procedure which is to protect the do-
mestic producers from dumped imports of several countries through
cumulative effect, "is equally applicable to likelihood-of-injury deter-
minations in sunset reviews."58
The cumulation for sunset reviews need not conform to Article
3.3 which requires the investigating authority to demonstrate that im-
ports from a particular country are not negligible before it can cumu-
late those imports from other countries. In US - Carbon Steel, the
Panel held that "Article 3.3, by its own terms, is limited in application
to [original] investigations and does not apply to sunset reviews."59
6. The automatic self-initiation rule (19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(2)) is not
inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD.
The Panel in US - Carbon Steel held that the automatic self-
initiation provision stipulated in 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(2) is not inconsis-
tent with Article 11.3 of the AD. The U.S. provision is stated as
follows:
(2) Notice of initiation of review: Not later than 30 days
before the fifth anniversary of the date described in para-
graph (1), the administrating authority shall publish in
the Federal Register a notice of initiation of a review
under this subsection.
Japan argued that "Article 11.3 creates a presumption of termination
of an anti-dumping order after five years of application. Therefore, the
55 PATTISON, supra note 9, at 136.
56 Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Argentina), supra note 7, 290.
57 Id. 293.
58 Id. 296.
59 Panel Report, US - Carbon Steel, supra note 7, $ 7.101.
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decision to continue the imposition [of additional anti-dumping duty]
is equivalent to deciding to impose the order in an original investiga-
tion."6 ° Such reasoning leads to the conclusion that the evidentiary
standard that is used for the initiation of original investigations as
stipulated in Article 5.6 is also applicable to Article 11.3 sunset review
initiations. This means that the U.S. provision must stipulate the evi-
dentiary standard equivalent to that of the original investigation. The
Panel disagreed by noting that Article 11.3 does not mention in any
way the applicability of evidentiary standards used in the original in-
vestigation and no cross-reference is provided that links Article 11.3
with Article 5.6.61 The Panel held that "the text of Article 5.6 gives no
indication that its evidentiary standards apply to anything but the
self-initiation of investigations."6 2 The AB in the same case stated that
"[the] appeal did not raise any issues concerning the initiation of sun-
set review '63 but nevertheless appears to agree with the Panel by not-
ing the difference between original investigations and sunset reviews
thus indirectly supporting the inapplicability of the evidentiary stan-
dard in sunset reviews.6 4
7. The de minimis rule (19 C.F.R. § 351.106(c)) is not inconsistent
with Article 11.3 of the AD.
The Panel in US - Carbon Steel held the de minimis provision
stipulated in 19 C.F.R. § 351.106(c) is not inconsistent with Article
11.3 of the AD. The U.S. provision is stated as follows:
(c) Reviews and other Determinations
(1) In general. In making any determination other than
a preliminary or final antidumping or countervailing
duty determination in an investigation, the Secretary [of
Commerce] will treat as de minimis any weighted-aver-
age dumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate that
is less than 0.5% ad valorem, or the equivalent specific
rate.
Japan argued that instead of 0.5%, the 2% de minimis standard in
Article 5.8 should be applied to sunset reviews. 65 As in the case of au-
tomatic self-initiation of sunset reviews, the Panel noted the absence
of any explicit provision that mandated the application of de minimis
standard in Article 11.3 or any cross-reference between Article 11.3
60 Id. 7.11.
61 Id. IT 7.26, 7.27.
62 Id. 7.36.
63 Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel, supra note 7, 1 105 fn. 115.
64 Id. 106.
65 Panel Report, US - Carbon Steel, 1 7.58.
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and Article 5.8.66 The Panel further noted the qualitative difference
between sunset reviews and original investigations and subsequently
held the de minimis provision of Article 5.8 is not applicable to sunset
reviews.67 The AB in the same case did not explicitly address the is-
sue, but did indirectly affirm the Panel's decision by pronouncing the
AB finding in US - Carbon Steel (Germany),68 which addressed coun-
tervailing duty ("CVD") sunset reviews, will be applied, mutatis mu-
tandis.69 Because US - Carbon Steel (Germany) holds that the de
minimis provision in the Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing
Measures is not applicable to CVD sunset reviews,70 the AB has in
effect indirectly held that the equivalent provision of Article 5.8 is also
not applicable in the antidumping sunset review context.
8. The order-wide determination rule (Section II.A.2 of the SPB) is
not inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 11.3 of the AD.
The AB in US - Carbon Steel held that the "order-wide deter-
mination" provision stipulated in section II.A.2 of the SPB is not incon-
sistent with Article 6.10 and 11.3 of the AD. Section II.A.2 states "the
[DOC] will make its determination of likelihood on an order-wide ba-
sis." The "order-wide determination" differs from the "company-spe-
cific determination;" the former refers to the revocation of the
antidumping duty order imposed on all relevant exporters, and the lat-
ter refers to the revocation of the antidumping duty on a specific ex-
porter. Japan argued that because Article 6.10 requires investigating
authority to determine an individual dumping margin, and that Arti-
cle 6 is incorporated into Article 11 through the cross-reference provi-
sion in Article 11.4,71 the Article 11.3 sunset review also mandates"company-specific determination."72 The AB disagreed, first noting
that Article 11.3 "contains no express reference to individual export-
ers, producers, or interested parties," and that "on its face, Article 11.3
therefore does not oblige investigating authorities in a sunset review
to make 'company-specific' likelihood determinations."73 The AB then
held that Article 6.10's individual dumping margin calculation "do[es]
not require that the determination of likelihood of continuation or re-
66 Id. 1 7.67, 7.71.
67 Id. 7.85.
68 Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain Cor-
rosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Products from Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28,
2002) [hereinafter US - Carbon Steel (Germany)].
69 Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel, 104 n. 114.
70 Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel (Germany), 68.
71 Article 11.4 provides that "the provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and
procedure shall apply to any review carried out under this Article."
72 See Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel, 11 151-54.
73 Id. 149.
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currence of dumping under Article 11.3 be made on a company-specific
basis," 4 since there is "no obligation [] imposed on investigating au-
thorities to calculate or rely on dumping margins in a sunset re-
view."7 5 The decision was reaffirmed by the AB in US - OCTG
(Argentina).76
9. The waiver provisions in 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(4)(B) and 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.218(d)(2)(iii) are inconsistent with Articles 6.1, 6.2 and
11.3 of the AD.
The AB in US - OCTG (Argentina) held that the waiver provi-
sions stipulated in 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(4)(B) and 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.218(d)(2)(iii) are inconsistent with Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 11.3 of
the AD. The U.S. provisions are stated as follows:
19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(4)(B) Effect of waiver
In a review in which an interested party waives its par-
ticipation pursuant to this paragraph, the administering
authority shall conclude that revocation of the order or
termination of the investigation would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of dumping ... with respect
to that interested party.7 7
19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2) Waiver of response by a respon-
dent interested party to a notice of initiation -
(iii) No response from a respondent interested party. The
Secretary [of Commerce] will consider the failure by a re-
spondent interested party to file a complete substantive
response to a notice of initiation.., as a waiver of partic-
ipation in a sunset review before the [DOC].78
Argentina argued that the waiver provisions stipulating an affirma-
tive waiver and a deemed waiver 79 prevent the U.S. investigating au-
thority to undertake a substantive review warranted under Article
11.3." The AB agreed with Argentina by first noting that the opera-
74 Id. 155.
75 Id. 123. But in case where a dumping margin that was previously calculated
was used for the likelihood determination in a sunset review, the margin must be
calculated in a manner consistent with Article 2.4. Id. 127. See infra note 112.
76 Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Argentina), 231.
77 19 U.S.C.S. § 1675(c)(4)(B).
78 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2)(iii) (2005)
79 An affirmative waiver occurs when an interested party explicitly waives partici-
pation by filing a statement of waiver with the DOC. A deemed waiver occurs
when an interested party is "deemed" to have waived its participation by filing
incomplete substantive response to the notice of initiation of a sunset review.
Panel Report, US - OCTG (Argentina), 1 7.83.
80 Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Argentina), 224.
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tion of the waiver provision results in the DOC's arrival "at affirmative
company-specific determinations without regard to any evidence on re-
cord, ... merely assumptions made by the agency, rather than findings
supported by evidence.""' The AB then held that because subsequent
order-wide determinations will be at least partly based on the com-
pany-specific determination that has been made without any evidence
on record, the final determination lacks a reasoned conclusion and pos-
itive evidence.8 2 As for the waiver's inconsistency with Article 6.1 and
6.2, the AB held that the DOC's complete disregard of any information
submitted by a respondent in an incomplete response is incompatible
with the "ample" and "full" opportunities to defend their right as stipu-
lated in Articles 6.1 and 6.2.83
10. No requirement for causation between dumping and injury (19
U.S.C. § 1675(c)) is not inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD.
The AB in US - OCTG (Mexico) held that there is no require-
ment to establish the existence of a causal link between likely dump-
ing and likely injury under Article 11.3 of the AD.84 The AB compared
the relevant provisions in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 11.3
of the AD and determined that "the 'review' contemplated in Article
11.3 is a 'distinct' process with a 'different' purpose from the original
investigation." 5 Then, the AB resorted to a textual analysis of Article
11.3 and concluded that the essential aspect of Article 11.3 "is proof of
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury, if the
duty expires,"6 and that the requirement of causal link is not to be
found in the provision. The AB noted that the application of the causal
link to a sunset review would in effect "[convert] the review into an
original investigation, which cannot be justified.""
81 Id. 234.
82 Id.
83 Id. 245-46.
84 The AB did not indicate the relevant U.S. provision that would be subject to
this issue. The reasonable choice would be 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c), the provision based
on which the International Trade Commission made its likelihood determination.
See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Italy, Korea, Japan, and Mexico,
66 Fed. Reg. 35,997 (July 10, 2001).
85 Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, T 118.
86 Id. 123.
87 Id.
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IV. DSB FINDINGS ON U.S. ANTIDUMPING SUNSET REVIEW
PROVISIONS "AS APPLIED"
1. The DOC's Determination of the Likelihood of Continuation or
Recurrence of Dumping
The Panel in US - OCTG (Mexico) held that the DOC's deter-
mination of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping
("LCRD") in the sunset review was inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the
AD. The Panel there held that the investigating authority administer-
ing sunset reviews "must act with an appropriate degree of diligence
and arrive at a reasoned conclusion on the basis of information gath-
ered as part of a process of reconsideration and examination."8 8 In ac-
cordance with the standard, the Panel then examined the DOC's
determination and found that the DOC had ignored the data submit-
ted by Mexican exporters and relied "exclusively on the basis of a de-
cline in import volumes." 9 The Panel concluded that the DOC was
required "to at least consider [the] information and take it into account
before making its determination."9" The Panel noted that where the
DOC failed to incorporate any information submitted by the exporters,
it had failed to support its decision by a reasoned and adequate conclu-
sion as mandated by Article 11.3. The Panel's finding was not
appealed. 9 1
The Panel in US - OCTG (Argentina) also held that the DOC's
determination of the LCRD in the sunset review was inconsistent with
Article 11.3 of the AD. The Panel first noted that the investigating
authority has an obligation to make a "reasoned finding on the positive
evidence" in determining the likelihood of dumping.9 2 It then found
that the DOC used two factual findings that the dumping continued
over the life of the measure and that the import volumes declined fol-
lowing the antidumping duty imposition.93 For the former finding, the
DOC was found to have only relied on the original dumping margin to
determine the continued dumping over the life of the measure. 4 The
Panel held that "the original determination of dumping by itself can-
not represent a sufficient factual basis ...... to conclude that dump-
88 Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, q 7.74.
"9 Id. 7.78.90 Id. 7.79.
91 See Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, 220.
92 Panel Report, US - OCTG (Argentina), supra note 7, 7.211.
93 Id. 7.221.
94 Id. 7.219.
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ing is likely to continue or recur after the expiry of the order."95 The
Panel's finding was not appealed. 96
In contrast, the AB in US - Carbon Steel held that the DOC's
determination of LCRD in the sunset review was not inconsistent with
Article 11.3. Japan argued that "the DOC failed to make a proper, pro-
spective likelihood determination ...... and based its determination
exclusively on historical data relating to dumping and the volume of
dumped imports."9 " The AB, however, found that the DOC had in fact
considered the information submitted by the Japanese exporter and
that the DOC was entitled to reject the information submitted in an
untimely fashion.9" Ultimately, the AB held that there were sufficient
justifications for the DOC's reliance on dumping margins and import
levels, thus the determination was not inconsistent with Article 11.3."
2. The ITC's Determination of the Likelihood of Continuation or
Recurrence of Injury
The Panel in US - OCTG (Mexico) held that the International
Trade Commission's ("ITC") determination of the likelihood of continu-
ation or recurrence of injury ("LCRI") in the sunset review was not
inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 11.3 of the AD. Mexico first
argued that the ITC must undergo a detailed injury determination
process that is provided in Article 3.1o The Panel, however, disagreed
and denied the applicability of Article 3 process in sunset reviews be-
cause the determination was made "regarding the likelihood of... in-
jury rather than... injury."1 °1 The Panel then noted that the ITC had
based its determination on a proper establishment of facts and an un-
biased and objective evaluation of [the] facts,'0 2 by presenting five rea-
sons why the likely volume of import after the revocation of the
dumping duty would be significant to cause injury. 10 3 The Panel
deemed such explanation of the ITC to satisfy the requirement of Arti-
95 Id.
96 See Notification of an Appeal, United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/5 (Aug. 31,
2004).
97 Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel, supra note 7, 192.
98 Id. 202.
99 Id. 205.
100 See Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, IT 7.120-.121.
101 Id. 7.121.
102 See id. 7.122.
103 The five reasons stated are; (1) market share, (2) incentive of producers, (3)
prices, (4) whether being subject to other import barriers, (5) extent of dependence
on exports. See id. 7.124.
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cle 11.3. This issue was not appealed but it was indirectly affirmed
through the AB's finding on the causation issue. 10 4
Similarly, the AB in US - OCTG (Argentina) held that the ITC's de-
termination of the LCRI in the sunset review was not inconsistent
with Article 11.3 of the AD. Argentina argued that the panel erred in
its determination of the following three issues: (1) the likely volume of
dumped imports; (2) the likely price effects of dumped imports; and (3)
the likely impact of dumped imports on the U.S. industry. 10 5 On all
three accounts, the AB held that the ITC presented a sufficient factual
basis for determining the LCRI.' °6 With regard to the likely volume of
dumped imports, the following five factors were held sufficient to sup-
port the ITC's conclusion: (1) the importance of the U.S. market; (2)
the profitability of the products concerned; (3) the price level of the
products concerned; (4) the existence of import restrictions faced by
the interested party; and (5) the level of export dependency.1' 7 The AB
noted that "positive evidence" does not mean incontrovertible evi-
dence, and that the standard may be satisfied even when "the infer-
ences drawn from the evidence on record are projections into the
future."' os
3. The ITC's Determination of the Likelihood of Continuation or
Recurrence of Injury within a Reasonably Foreseeable Time
The AB in US - OCTG (Argentina) held that the ITC's basis
for the determination of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
injury in the sunset was not inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the
AD. 10 9 Argentina argued that the failure to "specify the relevant
timeframe for the injury determination is not a 'properly reasoned and
supported determination' and does not have a 'firm evidentiary foun-
dation." '1 10 The AB disagreed and held that Article 11.3 textually does
not provide any requirement for the specification of timeframe and
that the lack of timeframe can still provide the properly reasoned and
sufficient factual basis required for the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of injury."'
104 See supra Part III.10.
105 Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Argentina), supra note 7, 319.
106 Id. I 342, 348, 352 (upholding the findings in Panel Report, I 7.298, 7.306,
7.312).
107 Id. 330, 341.
108 Id. 341.
109 Id. 362.
110 Id. 363.
"' Id. 364.
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4. Zeroing used in Sunset Reviews
The AB in US - Carbon Steel noted that the investigating au-
thority's determination of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence
of injury, relying on dumping margins that resorted to "zeroing" meth-
odology, 112 was inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD. As for its ap-
plication to the actual case, however, the AB declined to rule on the
consistency of the DOC's determination because the factual basis was
insufficient to determine whether the DOC had actually resorted to
the zeroing as defined in EC - Bed Linen.113 The AB added that "Arti-
cle 11.3 does not expressly prescribe any specific methodology for in-
vestigating authorities to use in making a likelihood determination in
a sunset review."' 14 Therefore, Article 2, which specifies the methodol-
ogy of calculating dumping margin, needs not be applied to sunset re-
views. Nevertheless, the AB held that "should investigating
authorities choose to rely upon dumping margins in making their like-
lihood determination, the calculation of these margins must conform to
the disciplines of Article 2.4." 115 The AB reasoned that "[i]f these mar-
gins [that resorted to 'zeroing'] were legally flawed because they were
calculated in a manner inconsistent with Article 2.4, this could give
rise to an inconsistency not only with Article 2.4, but also with Article
11.3 of the [AD]." 116
V. THE U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DSB FINDINGS IN
US - OCTG (ARGENTINA)
For those issues that were held to be inconsistent with WTO
law by the Panel and the AB in US - OCTG (Argentina), the U.S. has
so far made limited progress in implementing the findings. Argentina
and the U.S. underwent an arbitration process under Article 21.3(c) of
the DSU, and the reasonable period of time for the U.S. to implement
112 Zeroing is a dumping margin calculation method where negative difference be-
tween export price and normal value is treated as zero. For example, when a prod-
uct under antidumping investigation has different product models, a dumping
margin for each model has to be calculated and then accumulated to obtain the
representative dumping margin for the product. In the process, some models may
exhibit negative dumping margin where the export price is higher than the normal
value. This margin was assigned zero, rather than a negative value, skewing the
accumulation process. Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Anti-
dumping Duties on Import of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India, T 47, WT/DS141/
AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter EC - Bed Linen]. Zeroing has been held to be
inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the AD. Id. 66.
113 Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel, 1 137.
114 Id. T 123.
115 Id. T 127.
116 Id.
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the findings was determined to be twelve months from December 17,
2004, the date on which the DSB adopted the Panel and AB Reports.
The expiration date, therefore, was December 17, 2005."' With the
deadline already passed, the U.S. has yet to fulfill its obligation in
bringing its measures into conformity with the DSB findings.1 1 8
With regard to the inconsistency of the waiver provision, the
DOC proposed the amendment of the relevant regulations on August
15, 2005 and invited public comments. 1 19 Two amendments were sub-
sequently made to the relevant regulations. First, 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.218(d)(2)(iii) was deleted. 120 Second, the requirements for a
statement of waiver were revised by adding a statement where the
waiving respondent party in effect pronounces that it is likely to dump
in case the antidumping order is revoked.' 2 1 These amendments were
made effective on October 31, 2005 thus complying with the above
deadline. 122 The DOC denied the need to amend 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(c)(4)(B), by stating that "[b]y modifying [the] waiver provisions,
the [DOC] has eliminated the possibility that its order-wide likelihood
determinations would be based on assumptions about likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of dumping . . . due to interested parties'
waiver of participation in sunset reviews."'1 23 This is a foregone conclu-
sion since the waiving parties would already have pronounced that
they are likely to dump if the antidumping order were revoked. The
DOC has not yet initiated a new sunset review that will determine the
117 Award of the Arbitrator, United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, 53, WT/DS268/12
(June 7, 2005).
118 The U.S. measure found to be inconsistent with WTO law cannot be challenged
within the U.S. without an act of implementation domestically. Section 102(a)(1)
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, (19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2000), provides
that U.S. law will prevail in conflict and that "[n]o provision of any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have
effect."
119 Procedures for Conducting Five-year ("Sunset") Reviews of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders, 70 Fed. Reg. 47,738 (Aug. 15, 2005) (codified at 19
C.F.R. pt. 351).
120 Id. at 47,739.
121 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(d)(2)(1) (2006). The relevant provision reads: "Every state-
ment of waiver must include a statement indicating that the respondent inter-
ested party waives participation in the sunset review before the [DOC]; a
statement that the respondent interested party is likely to dump ... if the order is
revoked or the investigation is terminated." Id.
122 Procedures for Conducting Five-Year ("Sunset") Reviews of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders, 70 Fed. Reg. 62,061 (Oct. 28, 2005) (codified at 19
C.F.R. pt. 351).
123 Id. at 62,062-63.
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revised likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping that would
be consistent with Article 11.3.124
VI. COMMENTS
The three cases that the DSB addressed with regard to the
sunset reviews follow roughly two prongs of legal reasoning. The first
prong focuses on the difference between original investigations and
sunset reviews. As held by the DSB numerous times, sunset reviews as
governed by Article 11.3 of the AD are procedurally different from orig-
inal investigations. 125 Examples of this reasoning can be found in most
of the "as such" issues like the timeframe, cumulation, automatic self-
initiation, and de minimis topics previously mentioned. The second
prong relates to the requirement of a sufficient factual basis for the
determination of the continuation of the duty order. Examples of this
reasoning are found in the waiver and "as applied" issues discussed
above. The combination of the two prongs results in an interesting syn-
thesis. The first prong leads to a simple corollary that the antidumping
authority enjoys discretion in determining the LCRDI. Although Arti-
cle 11.3 does not offer any cross-reference clause that links it with
other articles of the AD, such as Articles 3 and 5 which govern original
investigations and any mention of rules or standards for the determi-
nation, this is an acceptable formulation. Under such a formulation,
the role of the second prong is to provide the outer contour of that dis-
cretion, which is aptly framed as the requirement of a sufficient fac-
tual basis. The DSB at this point has an opportunity to set the
evidentiary standard of what constitutes a sufficient factual basis. The
standard spans the range from the highest level where the burden of
the authority is to prove beyond doubt that there is the LCRDI, to the
lowest level where the burden of the authority is to provide minimal
evidence which would be enough to establish the LCRDI.
The first prong establishes that original investigations and
sunset reviews are two distinct processes and the antidumping author-
ity administering the sunset review enjoys wide discretion. The impor-
tant point is that although the second prong does provide a limitation
to this discretion, it does not apply to the discretion in selecting the
methodologies used to determine the LCRDI. It is only at the applica-
124 Although no sunset review has been initiated, it is interesting to note that the
DOC did initiate the (annual) administrative review on antidumping duty im-
posed on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina. The notification does not
indicate that the review is initiated as a new sunset review. Initiation of An-
tidumping and Countervailing Duty Reviews and Request for Revocation in Part,
70 Fed. Reg. 56,631 (Sept. 28, 2005).
125 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, T 118
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tion stage of the methodology chosen that the second prong kicks in. 12 6
This is why the cases hold that the U.S. antidumping authority enjoys
a free hand in selecting any procedures (such as the cumulation rule in
Article 3.3) that will support the continuation of the antidumping duty
and dispense with procedures (such as the de minimis rule in Article
5.8) that will support the termination. With Article 11.3 providing the
textual basis for such discretion, the DSB is obliged to give deference
to antidumping authorities in their choice of the LCRDI determination
methodologies.
A balancing issue arises at this junction. It is true that the text
of Article 11.3 does not provide any detailed guideline as to how the
LCRDI determination should proceed. But the textual structure of Ar-
ticle 11.3 does present two conflicting interests. One is the revocation
of the antidumping duty after five years. The language of Article 11.3
implies that the termination should be the default position. 12 7 The
other is the determination of LCRDI that warrants the continuation of
the duty order. The negotiation history of Article 11.3 during the Uru-
guay Round also provides the relevant background of this tension and
of a balance reached in the negotiation process. The draft of Article
11.3 proceeded from the New Zealand and Dunkel versions. Both con-
tained the language "necessary to offset" or "necessary to prevent" re-
quiring the antidumping authority to verify the necessity of the
antidumping duty in order to continue the measure. 12 The word
"likely" was also absent from the text. The combination of the two
meant that the objective of sunset reviews, which was to terminate the
antidumping duty order after five years, would be procedurally and
substantively protected from abuse by those seeking to continue the
measure. This is because the antidumping authority would have to
prove the continuation or recurrence, not its mere likelihood, and
would have to provide a rationale for the necessity of the duty order.
The U.S. objected to the Dunkel Draft language and proposed the dele-
tion of the word "necessary" and the insertion of the more flexible
126 For an analogous rationale, see Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel,
supra note 7, 123-27.
127 Michael Moore, Department of Commerce Administration of Antidumping Sun-
set Reviews: A First Assessment, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 675, 677 (2002).
128 The relevant passage of Article 11.3 from the New Zealand Draft reads,
"... that the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping and
prevent the continuation or recurrence of the injury." The relevant passage from
the Dunkel Draft reads, ". . . that the continued imposition of the duty is necessary
to prevent the continuation or recurrence of injury by dumped imports." TERRENCE
P. STEWART & AMY S. DWYER, WTO ANTIDUMPING AND SUBSIDY AGREEMENTS: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO "SUNSET" REVIEWS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EURO-
PEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES Appendix I (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague, 1998).
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term, "good cause," which would be deemed sufficient to justify the
continuation of the duty order.129 It appears that a compromise was
reached when the word "necessary" was deleted and the word "likely"
was inserted. The negotiating parties paid attention to the "exception"
clause of Article 11.3, which demonstrates that the termination and
the continuation interests were of equal significance.
With the two conflicting interests apparent in both the text and
the history of Article 11.3, the DSB must ensure that some balance is
reached. The first prong clearly supports whatever objective that an-
tidumping authorities seek, which is usually to continue the an-
tidumping duty in order to protect domestic producers 130 . The
authority has large discretion, as warranted by Article 11.3 and is free
to choose whatever methodology it sees fit' 1 '. The DSB must respect
that discretion, as held by numerous cases examined above. Thus, the
DSB has little role to play with regard to the first prong. Then the
DSB's role is to rely on the second prong in order to balance the two
interests. This is achieved through an adjustment of the evidentiary
standard in determining the LCRDI.132 An examination of the DSB
findings does not indicate that the DSB has considered the balancing
rationale as is proposed here. The DSB simply confers the antidump-
ing authority deference where as long as the authority has relied on
some reasonable evidence - without simply relying on conjecture lack-
ing any evidence - the determination would be deemed acceptable. The
inconsistency finding for the LCRD determinations in US - OCTG
(Mexico), US - OCTG (Argentina), and the waiver issue demonstrate
the level of evidence that does not satisfy the sufficient factual basis.
These cases hold that the antidumping authority cannot base its likeli-
133hood determination on a mere conjecture with no evidentiary basis .
The consistency finding for the LCRDI determination in US - OCTG
(Argentina) demonstrates that as long as the antidumping authority
considers some relevant factors, the determination is deemed to satisfy
the sufficient factual basis.13 4
129 The relevant passage from the U.S. draft reads, "... that there is good cause
for the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to prevent the continuation or
recurrence of injury by the dumped imports. Id. at 62.
130 Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEOWASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1,
115 (1995) (stating that the "purpose of an antidumping order is to provide relief
from imported goods that are unfairly competing in one's domestic market.").
131 See id. at 117-19.
132 See Michael Y. Chung, U.S. Antidumping Laws: A Look at the New Legislation,
20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 495, 521 (1995).
133 See Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, Annex. I, 2;
Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Argentina), supra note 7, 1180.
134 Appellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Argentina), 1210. The SPB issue in US
- OCTG (Mexico) is not directly related to the evidentiary standard discussed
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The above position of the DSB is reasonable if the finding for
each issue is considered separately. But, when the balancing require-
ment is brought into the picture, it is clear that the findings favor the
possibility of continuation of the antidumping duty measure over the
possibility of termination. Every sunset review case that is brought to
the DSB will inevitably contain issues that pertain to either the first
prong or the second prong. The DSB must ensure that the termination
and the continuation interest be balanced. The DSB must also recog-
nize the need for a stronger evidentiary standard that will balance
wide discretion that the antidumping authority enjoys in selecting the
method to determine the LCRDI. The standard that the DSB has set
in the three cases, although per se reasonable, is weaker than is war-
ranted. Antidumping authorities should administer a more rigorous
review - although not necessarily amounting to the complete proce-
dure of original investigations - that satisfies the evidentiary standard
of beyond doubt of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping and injury. For example, more weight should be conferred to
evidence denying the LCRDI than is the case under the current evi-
dentiary standard.
A somewhat related issue with the above evidentiary standard
has to do with the burden of proof. The widely accepted WTO rule is
that a party which makes an affirmative claim, whether it is the com-
plaining party or the defending party, bears the burden of proof.13 5
This means that by lowering the burden of proof that must be over-
come by a party to successfully establish a prima facie case - for exam-
ple, in the context of sunset review cases, a complaining party claiming
inconsistency of the antidumping authorities LCRDI determination -
the jurisprudential tilt which currently favors the continuation of an-
tidumping duty orders can be alleviated. Nevertheless, the DSB ap-
pears to be reluctant to take this route as demonstrated by the SPB
issue. The AB in US - OCTG (Mexico) did not address the burden of
proof issue while discussing the SPB. 1" Nevertheless, by denying that
here, since it pertained to the Panel's requirement of qualitative analysis for the
SPB's consistency. The evidentiary standard there had to do with the standard
that had to be met by the Panel, not the DOC. See Appellate Body Report, US -
OCTG (Mexico), 58.
135 See, MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS,
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAw, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 38 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2003) (citing Appellate Body Report,United States - Measure Affecting
Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 14, WTJDS33/AB/R (April
25, 1997)). See also, Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), supra note 7, $ 7.8.
136 The U.S. did raise the burden of proof issue, but the AB chose to rely on the
"legal characterization of fact" under Article 11 of the DSU which requires an ob-
jective assessment by the Panel irrespective of the burden of proof allocation. Ap-
pellate Body Report, US - OCTG (Mexico) [ 64, 195 (citing Appellate Body
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the Panel's qualitative analysis was based on fact, the AB has effec-
tively ruled that Mexico did not establish a prima facie case, despite
the extensive evidence provided to the Panel, thus significantly raising
the burden of proof of the complaining party. 137
Sunset reviews currently face heavy criticisms for being
abused by antidumping authorities where far too many antidumping
duty orders are continued after sunset reviews through the exception
clause of Article 11.3 of the AD.' 3 s Rough statistics show that for those
antidumping duty orders imposed by developed countries between
1995 and 1999, an average of 40% of them is not terminated.' 39 WTO
member states have brought numerous proposals to the WTO Negoti-
ating Group on Rules to improve the sunset review system. For exam-
ple, Korea suggests an "automatic sunset," the outright termination of
the antidumping duty order after five years.' 40 Canada proposes the
explicit enumeration of factors within the AD that antidumping au-
thorities must consider in making the LCRDI decision.' 4 ' These pro-
Report, EC - Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 116, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998)). See also, Appellate Body Report, Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Certain Dairy Products, 145, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) (stating
that there is "no provision in the DSU... that requires a panel to make an explicit
ruling on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case of violation
before a panel may proceed to examine the respondent's defence and evidence.").
137 See Panel Report, US - OCTG (Mexico), $ 7.52. Nevertheless, the increased
burden of proof may be narrowly interpreted, as being only applicable to the quali-
tative analysis methodology. This could be understandable given that the inconsis-
tency finding of the SPB "as such" can have a far reaching effect, which "would
have meant that [the DOC's] determination in every sunset review it had per-
formed since the adoption of the SPB had been decided in violation of WTO rules."
U.S. Sunset Policy Bulletin Found Not to Be WTO Inconsistent, 23 INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.wtonewsstand.com/ (search for "Sun-
set Policy Bulletin" and "November 4, 2005").
138 See, e.g., WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Paper from Brazil; Chile; Colom-
bia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Korea; Norway; the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore; Switzer-
land; Thailand and Turkey, Proposal on Sunset, TN/RL'W/76 (Mar. 19, 2003).
139 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from Chile; Hong Kong;
China; Japan; Korea, Rep. Of; Norway; Switzerland; Separate Customs Territory
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; and Thailand, Further Submission of Pro-
posals on Sunset, TN/RL/GEN/74, Annex I (Oct. 17, 2005). Another report states
that 54% of antidumping duty orders imposed by the U.S. between July 1998 and
March 2003 still remain in place after sunset reviews. WTO Negotiating Group on
Rules, Korea's View on the Improvement of the Sunset System, Submission of the
Republic of Korea, TN/RL/W/111 (May 27, 2003).
140 See supra note 130, Submission of the Republic of Korea.
141 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from Canada, Sunset Re-
views, TN/RL/ GEN/61 (Sept. 15, 2005).
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posals emphasize the goal of sunset reviews, which is to terminate
antidumping duty measures after five years. But it is also true that
the attempt on the outright amendment of Article 11.3 will face a stiff
opposition from the U.S., which is against any changes made to the
WTO antidumping regime. 14 2 In this respect, a "judicial" construction
of the antidumping sunset review regime that balances the interest of
the termination and the continuation of sunset reviews by the DSB
will provide another venue to address the concerns of the WTO Mem-
ber States.
142 See, e.g., Senate Concurrent Resolution 55 - Expressing the Sense of the Con-
gress Regarding the Conditions for the United States to Become a Signatory to any
Multilateral Agreement on Trade Resulting from the World Trade Organization's
Doha Development Agenda Round, S. Con. Res. 55, 109th Cong. (2005), 151 Cong.
Rec. S10760-02 (Sept. 29, 2005) (stating that it has been "[riesolved by the Senate
(the House of Representatives concurring), [tihat it is the sense of the Congress
that - (1) the United States should not be a signatory to any agreement or protocol
with respect to the Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization
negotiations, or any other bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations, that - (A)
adopts any proposal to lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disci-
plines on unfair trade or safeguard provisions, including proposals - (i) mandating
that unfair trade orders terminate after a set number of years even if unfair trade
and injury are likely to recur.").
